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By Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler
D
uring the past 20 years, the worlds
major central banks have been largely
successful at bringing inflation under con-
trol. Although it is premature to suggest that infla-
tion is no longer an issue of great concern, it is
quite conceivable that the next battles facing cen-
tral bankers will lie on a different front. One devel-
opment that has already concentrated the minds of
policymakers is an apparent increase in financial
instability, of which one important dimension is
increased volatility of asset prices. Borio, Ken-
nedy, and Prowse (1994), among others, docu-
ment the emergence of major boom-bust cycles
inthepricesofequityandrealestateinanumber
of industrialized countries during the 1980s.
Notable examples include the United States,
Japan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Finland.
Associated with the bust part of the asset
price cycle in many of these cases were signifi-
cant contractions in real economic activity. For
example, many economists attribute at least
some part of the 1990 recession (and the slow
recovery) in the United States to the preced-
ing decline in commercial real estate prices,
which weakened the capital positions of banks
and the balance sheets of corporate borrowers
(Bernanke and Lown). More recently, of
course, we have seen asset price crashes in East
Asia and Latin America, along with continued
stagnation of stock and land prices in Japan, all
of which have been associated with poor eco-
nomic performance. With these experiences in
mind, some observers have viewed the remark-
able rise of the past few years in U.S. stock
prices, and to a lesser extent in real estate
prices, as an ominous development. Of course,
as of this writing, whether the U.S. stock mar-
ketboomwillbesustainedorwillendintearsis
anybodys guess.
In this paper we address the question of how
central bankers ought to respond to asset price
volatility, in the context of an overall strategy
for monetary policy. To be clear, we agree that
monetary policy is not by itself a sufficient tool
to contain the potentially damaging effects of
booms and busts in asset prices. Well-designed
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sound regulatory structure that helps to limit the
risk exposure of banks and corporations, and
prudent fiscal policies that help instill public
confidence in economic fundamentals, are all
vital components of an overall strategy to insu-
late the economy from financial disturbances.
However, our reading of history is that asset
price crashes have done sustained damage to the
economy only in cases when monetary policy
remained unresponsive or actively reinforced
deflationary pressures. This observation is our
justificationforfocusingonmonetarypolicyhere.
The principal argument of the paper is easily
stated. Our view is that, in the context of short-
term monetary policy management, central banks
shouldviewpricestabilityandfinancialstability
as highly complementary and mutually consis-
tent objectives, to be pursued within a unified
policy framework. In particular, we believe that
the best policy framework for attaining both
objectivesisaregimeofflexibleinflationtarget-
ing, either of the implicit form now practiced in
the United States or of the more explicit and
transparent type that has been adopted in many





or deflationary pressures. Importantly, for pres-
ent purposes, it also implies that policy should
not respond to changes in asset prices, except
insofar as they signal changes in expected infla-
tion. Trying to stabilize asset prices per se is prob-
lematic for a variety of reasons, not the least of
which is that it is nearly impossible to know for
sure whether a given change in asset values results
from fundamental factors, nonfundamental fac-
tors, or both. By focusing on the inflationary or
deflationary pressures generated by asset price
movements, a central bank effectively responds
to the toxic side effects of asset booms and busts
without getting into the business of deciding
what is a fundamental and what is not. It also
avoids the historically relevant risk that a bub-
ble, once pricked, can easily degenerate into
a panic. Finally, because inflation targeting both
helps to provide stable macroeconomic condi-
tions and also implies that interest rates will
tend to rise during (inflationary) asset price
boomsandfallduring(deflationary)assetprice
busts, this approach may reduce the potential
for financial panics to arise in the first place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. We begin in Section I with an informal
summary of our views on how asset prices
interact with the real economy and of the associ-
ated implications for monetary policy. To address
these issues more formally, Sections II and III pre-
sent some illustrative policy simulations derived
fromasmall-scalemacroeconomicmodelthatfea-
tures an explicit role for financial conditions in
determiningrealactivity.Wemovefromtheoryto
practice in Section IV, in which we briefly
examine the recent performance of monetary
policy in the United States and Japan, both of
which have experienced asset price volatility.
Section V concludes with some discussion of
additional issues. The appendix provides more
details of the simulation model employed in
Sections II and III.
I. ASSET PRICES, THE ECONOMY,
AND MONETARY POLICY: AN
OVERVIEW
Assetprices,including,inparticular,theprices
of equities and real estate, are remarkably vari-
able. And although we must not lose sight of
the fact that ultimately asset prices are endoge-
nous variables, there are periods when asset
values seem all but disconnected from the cur-
rent state of the economy. As we noted in the
introduction, during the past two decades econ-
omies across the globe have experienced large
boombust cycles in the prices of various assets,
including equities, commercial real estate, resi-
dential housing, and others.
18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYShould fluctuations in asset prices be of con-
cern to policymakers? In the economists usual
benchmarkcase,aworldofefficientcapitalmar-
kets and without regulatory distortions, move-
ments in asset prices simply reflect changes in
underlyingeconomicfundamentals.Underthese
circumstances, central bankers would have no
reason to concern themselves with asset price
volatility per se. Asset prices would be of inter-
est only to the extent that they provide useful
information about the state of the economy.
Matterschange,however,iftwoconditionsare
met. The first is that nonfundamental factors
sometime underlie asset market volatility. The
secondisthatchangesinassetpricesunrelatedto
fundamental factors have potentially significant
impacts on the rest of the economy. If these two
conditions are satisfied, then asset price volatil-
ity becomes, to some degree, an independent
source of economic instability, of which policy-
makers should take account.
That both of these conditions hold seems plausi-
ble to us, though there is room for disagreement
on either count. We briefly discuss each in turn.
As potential sources of nonfundamental fluc-
tuations in asset prices, at least two possibilities
have been suggested: poor regulatory practice
and imperfect rationality on the part of investors
(market psychology). Regarding the former,
Borioandotherspresentevidencefortheviewthat
financial reforms that dramatically increased
accesstocreditbyfirmsandhouseholdscontrib-
utedtoassetpriceboomsinthe1980sinScandina-
via, Japan, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom, and elsewhere. Financial liberalizations in
developing countries that have opened the gates
for capital inflows from abroad have also been
associated in some cases with sharply rising asset
values, along with booms in consumption and
lending.
But arent liberalizations a good thing? It
depends. As Allen and Gale and others have
emphasized, problems arise when financial lib-
eralizations are not well coordinated with the
regulatory safety net (for example, deposit
insurance and lender-of-last-resort commit-
ments). If liberalization gives additional powers
to private lenders and borrowers while retaining
government guarantees of liabilities, excessive
risk-taking and speculation will follow, leading,
in many cases, to asset price booms. Ultimately,
however, unsound financial conditions are
exposed and lending and asset prices collapse.
This scenario seems to characterize reasonably
well the banking crises recently experienced in a
number of countries, including the United States
and Japan, as well as some of the recent crises in
East Asia and Latin America.
The other possible source of nonfundamental
movements in asset prices that has received
much attention is irrational behavior by inves-
tors, for example, herd behavior, excessive
optimism,orshort-termism.Thereis,ofcourse,a
large amount of literature on bubbles, fads, and
the like. This literature has gained a measure of
credence because of the great difficulty of
explaining the observed level of financial vola-
tility by models based solely on economic fun-
damentals(see,forexample,therecentsurveyby
Campbell). Advocates of bubbles would proba-
bly be forced to admit that it is difficult or impos-
sible to identify any particular episode
conclusively as a bubble, even after the fact.
1
Nevertheless, episodes of irrational exuber-
ance in financial markets are certainly a logi-
cal possibility, and one about which at least
some central bankers are evidently concerned.
With this concern as motivation, we present
simulations of the economic effects of bubbles
and of alternative policy responses to bubbles
in Section III.
The second necessary condition for asset-
price volatility to be of concern to policymakers
is that booms and busts in asset markets have
important effects on the real economy. Although
the two-way causality between the economy
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estimates of the real effects of changes in asset
prices, the historical experiencefrom the
Great Depression of the 1930s to the most recent
epidemic of crisesis supportive of the view
that large asset price fluctuations can have
important effects on the economy.
What are the mechanisms? One much-cited
possibility is that changes in asset prices affect
consumption spending via their effects on house-
holdwealth.Wearenotinclinedtoplaceaheavy
weightonthischannel,however.Empiricalstud-
ies (for example, Ludvigson and Steindel;
Parker) have not found a strong or reliable con-
nection between stock market wealth and con-
sumption, for example. This result is, perhaps, not
too surprising, as much of the stock owned by
households is held in pension accounts, implying
that changes in stock values have relatively little
direct impact on spendable cash.
Our own view is that the quantitatively most
important connections between asset prices and
the real economy operate through aspects of
what in earlier work we have called the balance
sheet channel.
2 The world in which we live, as
opposedtotheoneenvisionedbythebenchmark
neoclassical model, is one in which credit mar-
kets are not frictionless; that is, problems of
information, incentives, and enforcement are
pervasive. Because of these problems, credit can
beextendedmorefreelyandatlowercosttobor-
rowers who already have strong financial posi-
tions (hence, Ambrose Bierces definition of a
banker as someone who lends you an umbrella
whenthesunisshiningandwantsitbackwhenit
starts to rain).
A key implication of the existence of credit-
market frictions is that cash flows and the condi-
tion of balance sheets are important determi-
nants of agents ability to borrow and lend.
Research suggests that the effects of asset price
changes on the economy are transmitted to a
very significant extent through their effects on
the balance sheets of households, firms, and
financial intermediaries (see, for example,
Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, forthcoming;
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). For example,
firmsorhouseholdsmayuseassetstheyholdas
collateral when borrowing, in order to amelio-
rate information and incentive problems that
would otherwise interfere with credit extension.
Under such circumstances, a decline in asset
values (for example, a fall in home equity val-
ues) reduces available collateral, leads to an
unplanned increase in leverage on the part of
borrowers, and impedes potential borrowers
access to credit. Financial intermediaries, which
must maintain an adequate ratio of capital to
assets,canbedeterredfromlending,orinduced
to shift the composition of loans away from
bank-dependent sectors such as small business,
bydeclinesinthevaluesoftheassetstheyhold.
Deteriorating balance sheets and reduced
credit flows operate primarily on spending and
aggregate demand in the short run, although in
the longer run they may also affect aggregate
supply by inhibiting capital formation and
reducing working capital. There also are likely
to be significant feedback and magnification
effects. First, declining sales and employment
imply continuing weakening of cash flows and,
hence, further declines in spending. Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) refer to this mag-
nification effect as the financial accelerator
(see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, for an early
formalization). Second, there may also be feed-
back to asset prices, as declining spending and
income,togetherwithforcedassetsales,leadto
further decreases in asset values. This debt-
deflation mechanism, first described by Irving
Fisher,hasbeenmodeledformallybyBernanke
and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore, and
Bernanke,Gertler,andGilchrist(forthcoming).
A large amount of literature has studied the
macroeconomic implications of credit-market
frictions,boththeoreticallyandempirically.
3We
have reviewed that body of research on several
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note, however, that in general this perspective
hasprovedquiteusefulforinterpretinganumber
of historical episodes, including the Great Depres-
sion (Bernanke; Bernanke and James), the deep
Scandinavian recession of the 1980s, the credit
crunch episode of 1990-91 in the United States
(Bernanke and Lown), and the protracted weak-
ness of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. A
number of observers (Mishkin; Aghion,
Bacchetta, and Banerjee; Krugman) also have
used this framework to make sense of the fact
that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
exchange-rate devaluations have appeared to be
contractionary in a number of the developing
countries that experienced financial crises in
recent years. The explanation is tied to the fact
thatbeguiled by sometimes large interest dif-
ferentials between loans made in foreign and
domestic currenciesbanks and corporations in
these countries made liberal use of unhedged,
foreign-currency-denominated debt. The large
devaluations that subsequently occurred raised the
domestic-currency value of these debts, wreak-
ing havoc with bank and corporate balance
sheets and inducing financial distress and major
dislocations in credit, employment, and supplier
relationships.
Beyond providing a mechanism via which
nonfundamental movements in asset prices may
disrupt the economy, a key implication of the
credit-market-frictions perspective is that the
magnitude of the effects of asset-price fluctua-
tions on the economy will depend strongly on
initial financial conditions. By the term, we mean
primarily the initial state of household, firm, and
intermediary balance sheets.
4 In particular, the
theory predicts a highly nonlinear effect of asset
prices on spending (Bernanke and Gertler 1989).
Thus, if balance sheets are initially strong, with
low leverage and strong cash flows, then even
rather large declines in asset prices are unlikely
to push households and firms into the region of
financial distress, in which normal access to
credit is jeopardized, or to lead to severe capital
problemsforbanks.Putanotherway,theextent
to which an asset-price contraction weakens
private sector balance sheets depends on the
degree and sectoral distribution of initial risk
exposure.
The current (1999) U.S. economy is, we con-
jecture, a case in point. After many years of




tion in the stock market of, say, 25 percent
would, no doubt, slow the economy, but our
guessisthattheeffectswouldberelativelytran-
sitory, particularly if monetary policy responds
appropriately. In contrast, a 25 percent decline
in Japanese stock prices, given the parlous con-
dition of its financial system and its seeming
inability to implement a coherent stabilization
policy,would(weexpect)creategraveandlong-
lasting problems for that economy.
If we believe that asset price swings can occur
for nonfundamental reasons, and that these
swingseither through balance-sheet effects
or some other channelhave the potential to
destabilize the real economy, then what are the
implications for monetary policy? As sug-
gested in the introduction, our view is that cen-
tral banks can and should treat price stability
andfinancialstabilityasconsistentandmutually
reinforcing objectives. In practice, we believe,
thisisbestaccomplishedbyadoptingastrategy
of flexible inflation targeting.
5
Whatisflexibleinflationtargeting?Although
specific practices differ, broadly speaking, a
regime of inflation targeting has three charac-
teristics. First, as the name suggests, under
inflation targeting, monetary policy is commit-
ted to achieving a specific level of inflation in
the long run, and long-run price stability is des-
ignated the overriding or primary long-run
goal of policy. Importantly, inflation targeters
are concerned that inflation not be too low as
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tion is as important (or perhaps even more impor-
tant) as avoidance of high inflation. Second,
within the constraints imposed by the long-run
inflation objective, the central bank has some
flexibility in the short run to pursue other objec-
tives, including output stabilizationhence, the
nomenclature flexible inflation targeting.
6
Third, inflation targeting is generally character-
ized by substantial openness and transparency
on the part of monetary policymakers, including,
for example, the issuance of regular reports on
theinflationsituationandopenpublicdiscussion
of policy options and plans.
OurcharacterizationofFederalReservepolicy
in recent years is that it meets the first two parts
of the definition of inflation targeting (see Sec-
tion IVfor econometric support of this view) but
not the third; that is, the Fed practices implicit
rather than explicit inflation targeting. Bernanke
and others (1999) argue that the Fed ought to take
the next step and adopt explicit inflation targeting.
For most of the present paper, however, we make
no distinction between implicit and explicit infla-
tiontargeting;wereturntotheissuebrieflyinthe
conclusion.
For our purposes here, the main advantage of
flexible inflation targeting is that it provides a
unified framework both for making monetary
policy in normal times, and for preventing and
ameliorating the effects of financial crises. In
particular, a key advantage of the inflation-
targeting framework is that it induces policy-
makers to automatically adjust interest rates in a
stabilizing direction in the face of asset price
instability or other financial disturbances. The
logic is straightforward; since asset price
increases stimulate aggregate demand and asset
pricedeclinesreduceit,thestrongfocusofinfla-
tion targeters on stabilizing aggregate demand
will result in leaning against the windrais-
inginterestratesasassetpricesriseandreducing
them when they fall. This automatic response
not only stabilizes the economy but it is likely to
be stabilizing for financial markets themselves
forseveralreasons.First,macroeconomicstability,
particularly the absence of inflation or defla-
tion,isitselfcalmingtofinancialmarkets.
7Sec-
ond, the central banks easing in the face of
asset price declines should help to insulate
balance sheets to some degree, reducing the
economys vulnerability to further adverse
shocks. And, finally, if financial-market partici-
pants expect the central bank to behave in this
countercyclical manner, raising interest rates
when asset price increases threaten to overheat
the economy and vice versa, it is possible that
overreactionsinassetpricesarisingfrommarket
psychology and other nonfundamental forces
might be moderated.
The logic of inflation targeting also implies
that central banks should ignore movements in
stock prices that do not appear to be generating
inflationary or deflationary pressures. We con-
cedethatforecastingtheaggregatedemandeffects
ofasset price movements may not always be an
easy task. However, it is certainly easier than,
first, attempting to distinguish between funda-
mental and nonfundamental fluctuations in asset
pricesand,second,attemptingtosurgicallyprick
the bubble without doing collateral damage to
financial markets or the economy. We explore
the implications of alternative policy responses
toassetpricefluctuationsingreaterdetailinthe
next two sections.
II. MONETARY POLICY IN THE
PRESENCE OF ASSET PRICE
BUBBLES: A QUANTITATIVE
MODEL
To make the discussion of Section I more
concrete, we will present some model-based
simulations of the performance of alternative
monetary rules in the presence of bubbles in
asset prices. To do this, we extend a small-scale
macroeconomic model developed by Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (forthcoming), henceforth
BGG. For the most part, the BGG model is a
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fied to allow for financial accelerator effects, as
described in the previous section. Our principal
extension of the BGG model here is to allow for
exogenous bubbles in asset prices.
In this section, we first provide an informal
overview of the BGG model and then describe
howwemodifythemodeltoallowforbubblesin
asset prices. The equations of the complete
model are given in the Appendix.
8 (Readers who
are not interested in any of this background
material may wish to skip directly to the simula-
tion results in Section III.)
The BGG model
As noted, the foundation of the BGG model is
a standard dynamic new Keynesian framework.
The most important sectors are a household sec-
tor and a business sector. Households are infinitely
lived; they work, consume, and save. Business
firms are owned by entrepreneurs who have
finite expected life.
9 There is also a government
that manages fiscal and monetary policy.
Firms own the stock of physical capital,
financing the acquisition of capital through
internally generated funds (primarily revenues
from production and capital gains on assets) and
by borrowing from the public. With their accu-
mulated capital plus hired labor, firms produce
output, which may be used for consumption,
investment, or government purchases. There is
no foreign sector.
Following Taylor (1980), Calvo, and others,
BGG assume the existence of staggered nominal
price setting. The resulting stickiness in prices
allows monetary policy to have real effects on
the economy. Optimization and forward-looking
behavior are assumed throughout; the single
exception is the Phillips curve relationship, in
which inflation expectations are modeled as
being formed by a combination of forward- and
backward-looking behavior.
10 This modification
increases the persistence of the inflation pro-
cess, allowing a closer fit to the data.
The BGG model differs from this standard
dynamic new Keynesian framework primarily
in assuming the existence of credit-market
frictions, that is, problems of information,
incentives, and enforcement in credit relation-
ships. The presence of these frictions gives rise
to a financial accelerator that affects output
dynamics. In particular, in the BGG model,
credit-market frictions make uncollateralized
external finance more expensive than internal
finance. This premium for external finance
affects the overall cost of capital and, thus, the
real investment decisions of firms. The external
finance premium depends inversely on the
financial condition of potential borrowers. For
example, a borrowing firm with more internal
equitycanoffermorecollateraltolenders.Thus,
procyclical movements in the financial condi-
tion of potential borrowers translate into
countercyclical movements in the premium for
external finance, which, in turn, magnify invest-
ment and output fluctuations in the BGG model
(the financial accelerator).
Consider, for example, a shock to the econ-
omy that improves fundamentals, such as a
technological breakthrough. This shock will have
direct effects on output, employment, and the
like.IntheBGGmodel,however,therearealso
indirect effects of the shock, arising from the
associated increase in asset prices. Higher asset
prices improve balance sheets, reducing the
external finance premium and further stimulating
investment spending. The increase in invest-
ment may also lead to further increases in asset
pricesandcashflows,inducingadditionalfeed-
back effects on spending. Thus, the financial
accelerator enhances the effects of primitive
shocks to the economy.
Thefinancialacceleratormechanismalsohas
potentially important implications for the work-
ings of monetary policy. As in conventional
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gives the central bank in the BGG model some
control over the short-term real interest rate.
However, beyond the usual neoclassical chan-
nels through which the real interest rate affects
spending, in the BGG model there is an addi-
tional effect that arises from the impact of inter-
est rates on borrower balance sheets. For
example, a reduction in the real interest rate (a
policy easing) raises asset prices, improving the
financial condition of borrowers and reducing
the external finance premium. The reduction in
the premium provides additional stimulus for
investment. BGG find the extra kick provided
by this mechanism to be important for explain-
ing the quantitative effects of monetary policy.
Note also that, to the extent that financial crises
are associated with deteriorating private-sector
balance sheets, the BGG framework implies that
monetary policy has a direct means of calming
such crises.
The BGG model assumes that only funda-
mentals drive asset prices, so that the financial
accelerator serves to amplify only fundamen-
tal shocks, such as shocks to productivity or
spending. Our extension of the BGG frame-
work in this paper allows for the possibility
that nonfundamental factors affect asset
prices, which, in turn, affect the real economy
via the financial accelerator.
Adding exogenous asset price bubbles
Thefundamentalvalueofcapitalisthepresent
value of the dividends the capital is expected to
generate. Formally, define the fundamental value
of depreciable capital in period tQ t , as:
where Et indicates the expectation as of period
t,d is the physical depreciation rate of capital,
D i t+ are dividends, and Rt
q
+1 is the relevant sto-
chastic gross discount rate at t for dividends
received in period t +1.
As noted, our principal modification of the
BGG model is to allow for the possibility that
observed equity prices differ persistently from
fundamental values, for example, because of
bubbles or fads.
11 We use the term bub-
ble here loosely to denote temporary devia-
tions of asset prices from fundamental values,
due, for example, to liquidity trading or to
waves of optimism or pessimism.
12
The key new assumption is that the market
price of capital, S t, may differ from capitals
fundamental value, Qt. A bubble exists when-




with pa << 1.Ifthebubblecrashes,withproba-
bility1- p, then
Note that, because ap / >1, the bubble will
grow until such time as it bursts. For simplicity,
we assume that if a bubble crashes it is not
expected to re-emerge. These assumptions
imply that the expected part of the bubble fol-
lows the process
Because the parameter a is restricted to be
less than unity, the discounted value of the bub-
ble converges to zero over time, with the rate
governed by the value of a.
14 That is, bubbles
are not expected to last forever.
Using (2.1) and (2.4) we can derive an
24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
}, / ] ) 1 ( {[














R Q D E
R D E Q
+ + +
=








, ) ( 1 1 1
q
t t t t t R Q S
p
a
Q S + + + - = - (2.2)
. 0 1 1 = - + + t t Q S (2.3)












+ + (2.4)expression for the evolution of the stock price,
inclusive of the bubble:
where the return on stocks, Rt
s
+1, is related to the
fundamental return on capital, Rt
q
+1,b y
and ba º- () 1 d .
Equation (2.6) shows that, in the presence of
bubbles,theexpectedreturnonstockswilldiffer
fromthereturnimpliedbyfundamentals.Ifthere
is a positive bubble, S t/Qt >1, the expected
return on stocks will be below the fundamental
return, and vice versa if there is a negative bub-
ble, S t/Qt <1. However, if the bubble persists
(does not pop) a series of supranormal returns
will be observed. This process seems to us to
provide a reasonable description of speculative
swings in the stock market.
Thebubbleaffectsrealactivityintheextended
model in two ways. First, there is a wealth effect
on consumption. Following estimates of the
wealth effect presented in Ludvigson and
Steindel, we parameterize the model so that
these effects are relatively modest (about four
cents of consumption spending for each extra
dollar of stock market wealth). Second, because
the quality of firms balance sheets depends on
the market values of their assets rather than the
fundamental values, a bubble in asset prices
affectsfirmsfinancialpositionsand,thus,thepre-
mium for external finance.
Although bubbles in the stock market affect
balance sheets and, thus, the cost of capital, we
continuetoassumethatconditionalonthecost
of capitalfirms make investments based on
fundamental considerations, such as net present
value,ratherthanonvaluationsofcapitalinclud-
ing the bubble. This assumption rules out the
arbitrage of building new capital and selling it
at the market price cum bubble (or, equiva-
lently, issuing new shares to finance new capi-
tal).Thisassumptionistheoreticallyjustifiable,
forexample,bythelemonspremiumassociated
with new equity issues, and also seems empiri-
cally realistic; see, for example, Bond and
Cummins.
In summary, the main change effected by our
extension of the BGG framework is to allow
nonfundamental movements in asset prices to
influence real activity. Although the source of
the shock may differ, however, the main link
between changes in asset prices and the real
economy remains the financial accelerator, as
in the BGG model.




In this section we use the extended BGG
modeltosimulatetheeffectsofassetpricebub-
bles and related shocks, such as innovations to
the risk spread, on the economy. Our goal is to
explore what types of policy rules are best at
moderating the disruptive effects of asset mar-
ket disturbances. To foreshadow the results, we
findthatapolicyrulethatisactivelyfocusedon
stabilizing inflation seems to work well, and
that this result is reasonably robust across dif-
ferent scenarios.
As a baseline, we assume that the central
bank follows a simple forward-looking policy
rule of the form
where rt
n is the nominal instrument interest rate
controlled by the central bank, r
n
is the
steady-state value of the nominal interest rate,
and Et t p +1 is the rate of inflation expected in
the next model period. We will always
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t E r r p b (3.1)assume b>1, so that the central bank responds to
a one percentage point increase in expected infla-
tion by raising the nominal interest rate by more
than one percentage point. This ensures that the
real interest rate increases in the face of rising
expected inflation, so that policy is stabilizing.
The policy rule given by equation (3.1) differs
from the conventional Taylor rule in at least two
ways.
15 First, policy is assumed to respond to
anticipations of inflation rather than past values
of inflation. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998,
forthcoming) show that forward-looking reac-
tion functions are empirically descriptive of the
behavior of the major central banks since 1979.
See also the estimates presented in the next sec-
tion of this paper. The second difference from
the standard Taylor rule is that equation (3.1)
omits the usual output gap term. We do this pri-
marily for simplicity and to reduce the number
of dimensions along which the simulations must
be varied. There are a number of rationales for
this omission that are worth brief mention, how-
ever.First,forshocksthatprimarilyaffectaggre-
gate demand, such as shocks to asset prices,
rules of the form (3.1) and rules that include an
output gap term will be essentially equivalent in
their effects. Second, as we will see in the next
section, empirical estimates of the responsive-
ness of central banks to the output gap condi-
tional on expected inflation are often rather
small.Finally,assumingforsimulationpurposes
that the central bank can actually observe the
output gap with precision probably overstates
the case in reality. By leaving out this term we
avoid the issue of how accurately the central
bank can estimate the gap.
Although we do not include the output gap in
the policy rule (3.1), because of our focus on
asset price fluctuations, we do consider a variant
of(3.1)thatallowsthecentralbanktorespondto
changes in stock prices. Specifically, as an alter-
native to (3.1), we assume that the instrument
rate responds to the once-lagged log level of the
stock price, relative to its steady-state value:
Alternativeinterpretationsofpolicyruleslike
(3.2) are discussed in the next section.
We conducted a variety of simulation experi-
ments, of which we here report an illustrative
sampling. We begin with simulations of the
effects of a stock-market bubble that begins
with an exogenous one percentage point
increase in stock prices (above fundamentals).
We parameterize equation (2.4), which governs
the bubble process, so that the nonfundamental
component of the stock price roughly doubles
each period, as long as the bubble persists.
16
The bubble is assumed to last for five periods
and then burst.
17 Just before the collapse, the
nonfundamental component is worth about 16
percent of the initial steady state fundamental
value.
Asset bubbles with policy responding only to
inflation. Chart 1 illustrates the simulated
responses of the economy
18 to the bubble under
two policy rules of the form (3.1): an inflation
accommodatingpolicyforwhich b +101 . anda
moreaggressiveinflationtargetingpolicyfor
which b +20 . .
19
As Chart 1 shows, under the accommodating
policy, the bubble stimulates aggregate demand,
leading the economy to overheat. Inflation and
output rise sharply. The rise in stock prices stimu-
lates spending and output both through the bal-
ance sheet effects described earlier (notice the
declineintheexternalfinancepremiuminthefig-
ure, which stimulates borrowing) and through
wealth effects on consumption (which are the
relatively less important quantitatively). When
the bubble bursts, there is a corresponding col-
lapse in firmsnet worth. The resulting deterio-
ration in credit markets is reflected in a sharp
increase in the external finance premium (the
spread between firms borrowing rates and the
safe rate) and a rapid fall in output. The decline
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Chart 1
EFFECTS OF AN ASSET BUBBLE WHEN MONETARY POLICY RESPONDS
ONLY TO EXPECTED INFLATION
Notes: The panels of the chart show simulated responses of selected variables to a positive innovation to the bubble process in period
zeroequalto1percentofthesteady-statefundamentalprice. Theexanteprobabilitythatthebubblewillburstinanyperiodis 0.5.We
assume a realization in which the bubble bursts in period 5. The solid lines show responses under an aggresive monetary policy,
rE t
n
t t = + 20 1 . p . The dashed lines show responses under an accommodative policy, rE t
n
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5 0 15 10 5 01 5 10in output after the bursting of the bubble is
greater than the initial expansion, although the
integral of output over the episode is positive.
In the absence of further shocks, output does not
continue to spiral downward but stabilizes at a
leveljustbelowtheinitiallevelofoutput.Below
we consider scenarios in which the collapse of a
bubble is followed by a financial panic (a nega-
tive bubble), which causes the economy to dete-
riorate further.
Incontrasttotheaccommodativepolicy,Chart
1 shows that the more aggressive inflation tar-
geting policy greatly moderates the effects of
the bubble. Although policy is assumed not to
responddirectlytothestockmarketperse,under
the more aggressive rule, interest rates are
known by the public to be highly responsive to
the incipient inflationary pressures created by
the bubble. The expectation that interest rates
will rise if output and inflation rise is sufficient
both to dampen the response of overall asset
prices to the bubble and to stabilize output and
inflationeven though, ex post, interest rates
are not required to move by as much as in the
accommodative policy.
Asset bubbles with a policy response to stock
prices. Chart 2 shows simulation results analo-
goustothoseinChart1,exceptthatnowthecen-
tral bank is allowed to respond directly to stock
pricesaswellastoexpectedinflation.Wesetthe
parameter EQUA in equation (3.2) equal to 0.1,
implying that (for constant expected inflation) a
ten-percentage-point rise in the stock market
leads to a one percentage point rise in the instru-
ment rate. Of course, the full response of the
short-term rate to a stock market appreciation is
greaterthanthat,becausepolicyalsorespondsto
the change in expected inflation induced by a
bubble.
20
Chart 2 shows that the effect of allowing pol-
icy to respond to stock prices depends greatly on
whether policy is assumed to be accommodating
or aggressive with respect to expected inflation.
Under the accommodating policy b =101 . ,
allowing a response to stock prices produces a
perverse outcome. The expectation by the pub-
lic that rates will rise in the wake of the bubble
pushes down the fundamental component of
stock prices, even though overall stock prices
(inclusive of the bubble component) rise.
Somewhat counterintuitively, the rise in rates
and the decline in fundamental values actually
more than offset the stimulative effects of the
bubble, leading output and inflation to
declinean example of the possible collat-
eral damage to the economy that may occur
when the central bank responds to stock prices.
The result that the economy actually contracts,
though a robust one in our simulations, may
rely too heavily on sophisticated forward-look-
ingbehavioronthepartofprivate-sectorinves-
tors to be entirely plausible as a realistic
description of the actual economy. However,
the general point here is, we think, a valid
onenamely, that a monetary policy regime
that focuses on asset prices rather than on mac-
roeconomic fundamentals may well be actively
destabilizing. The problem is that the central
bank is targeting the wrong indicator.
Under the aggressive policy b =20 . , in con-
trast, allowing policy to respond to the stock
price does little to alter the dynamic responses
of the economy. Evidently, the active compo-
nent of the monetary rule, which strongly
adjusts the real rate to offset movements in
expected inflation, compensates for perverse
effects generated by the response of policy to
stock prices.
To recapitulate, the lesson that we take from
Chart 2 is that it can be quite dangerous for policy
simultaneouslytorespondtostockpricesandto
accommodate inflation. However, when policy
acts aggressively to stabilize expected inflation,
whether policy also responds independently to
stock prices is not of great consequence.
As an alternative metric for evaluating policy
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Chart 2
EFFECTS OF AN ASSET BUBBLE WHEN MONETARY POLICY RESPONDS TO
STOCK PRICES AS WELL AS TO EXPECTED INFLATION
Notes: The panels of the chart show simulated responses of selected variables to a positive innovation to the bubble process, under the
same assumptions as in Chart 1. The solid lines show responses under an aggresive monetary policy, rE s t
n
t tt =+ +- 20 01 11 .. p . The
dashed lines show responses under an accommodative policy, rE s t
n
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5 0 15 10 5 01 5 10responses to bubbles, we also computed the
unconditional variances of output and inflation
underthefourdifferentpolicyscenarios(accom-
modative versus nonaccommodative on infla-
tion, responding to stock prices versus not
responding). We considered bubbles lasting one,
two, and three periods, weighting them in the
population according to their relative likelihood
of being realized (conditional on a bubble start-
ing). The left panel of Table 1 reports the results.
Thetableshowsthatapolicyoffocusingaggres-
sivelyoninflationandignoringstockpricesdoes
best by a significant margin, achieving the low-
est unconditional variance of both output and
inflation.
21
Asset bubble then asset bust. So far in the sim-
ulations we have assumed that, after the collapse
of the bubble, asset prices are again governed
solely by fundamentals. With this assumption
wetendtofindthatastock-pricecrashwipesout
the output gains from the bubble but not much
more. There is only a slight overreaction in the
decline in output.
22
An alternative scenario, which may be of the
greatest concern to policymakers, is that the
collapse of a bubble might damage investor
confidence sufficiently to set off a panic in
financial markets. We model this possibility in
a simple way by assuming that the crash of the
bubblesetsoffanegativebubbleinstockprices
(an undervaluation) that is exactly symmetric
with the positive bubble that preceded it. This
panic is unanticipated by investors before it
happens.Ifwemaintaintheassumptionthatthe
initial positive bubble lasts five periods before
popping,thenthisalternativescenarioimpliesa
ten-period boom-bust scenario.
Chart 3 shows simulation results under the
accommodative (. ) b =101 and aggressive
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Table 1
VARIABILITY OF OUTPUT GAP AND INFLATION UNDER DIFFERENT
POLICY RULES
Bubble shock Technology shock
Policy rule: Output gap Inflation Output gap Inflation
rE t
n
tt = + 101 1 . p 2.221 9.676 1.409 17.975
rE t
n
tt = + 20 1 . p 1.471 .119 .103 .231
rE s t
n
tt t =+ +- 101 01 11 .. p 5.908 120.032 .987 39.855
rE s t
n
tt t =+ +- 20 01 11 .. p 1.518 1.556 .132 .767
Notes: Shown are the unconditional variances of the output gap and inflation under different policy rules, for bubble
shocks and technology shocks. A new bubble starts every period, and its size is randomly drawn from a standard normal
distribution. The probability that a bubble will last one, two, or three periods is, respectively, 0.5/0.875, 0.25/0.875, and
0.25/0.875, reflecting the relative probabilities of each duration when p = 0.5. Technology shocks are permanent and are
randomly drawn from a standard normal distribution.(. ) b =20 policy rules, and assuming no direct
response of policy to stock price movements
() x =0 .Thepositivebubblefollowedbytheneg-
ative bubble sets off an oscillation in both finan-
cial markets and the general economy. However,
the magnitude of the oscillation depends criti-
cally on the type of monetary policy employed.
Under the accommodative policy the cycle is
large,whereasthemoreaggressivepolicysignif-
icantly dampens the oscillation. By strongly tar-
geting expected inflation, monetary policy
stabilizes aggregate demand and, thus, greatly
reduces the economic effects of the volatility in
stock prices.
Note that in the experiment we assume that the
negative asset bubble arises after the initial
crash, regardless of the policy environment.
However, if there is some connection between
market psychology and fundamentals (for
example, markets overreact to movements in
fundamentals), and if financial market partici-
pants perceive policy has been effective in sta-
bilizing fundamentals, then perhaps the panic
mightnotariseinthefirstplace.Putdifferently,
an added benefit of the aggressive policy, not
accounted for in our simulations, might be to
reduce the overall likelihood of the follow-on
panic.
Implications of reduced leverage.A sw e
mentioned earlier, in a model with a financial
accelerator, the impact of the bubble on real
activity also depends on initial financial condi-
tions, such as the degree of leverage among
borrowers. Chart 4 explores the impact of a
lower steady-state leverage ratio, 25 percent
insteadof50percentasinthebaselinescenario.
The figure shows that a reduction in leverage
significantly moderates the cycle. Besides its
reaffirmation of the superiority of infla-
tion-focused monetary policy, this simulation
also suggests a rationale for regulatory and tax
policies that discourage excessive leverage.
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Chart 3
EFFECTS OF AN ASSET BOOM FOLLOWED BY AN ASSET BUST
Notes: Same exercise as in Chart 1, except that the positive bubble shock is followed by a symmetric negative bubble shock that lasts
from periods 6 through 10. Monetary policy responds only to expected inflation.Asset price fluctuations arising from a mixture
of fundamental and nonfundamental sources.
WesawinChart2thatallowingmonetarypolicy
to respond to asset prices can be destabilizing,
particularly if policy is accommodative of infla-
tion. The costs of targeting asset prices are prob-
ably greater in practice than suggested by the
bubble scenario of Chart 2, because it is quite
difficultorimpossibleforthecentralbanktodis-
cern whether changes in asset prices reflect fun-
damental forces, nonfundamental forces, or a
combination of both. To the extent that asset
price movements reflect fundamental forces,
they should be accommodated rather than
resisted. Attempts to stabilize asset prices in
that case are directly counterproductive.
To illustrate these issues, we consider a sce-
nario in which improvements in productivity
generate a rise in market fundamentals, as well
as increasing potential output. However, a
euphoric response to the fundamental boom also
sets off a bubble. Specifically, we suppose that
there is a 1 percent permanent increase in pro-
ductivitythatisfollowedoneperiodlaterbythe
inception of a stock-price bubble, which we
again assume lasts for five periods. Chart 5
shows the results, comparing an aggressive
inflation stabilization policy with one that also
allows for responses to stock prices. As the fig-
ure shows, in this scenario, tightening policy in
response to the increase in asset prices prevents
output from rising by the amount of the
increase in potential output. In other words,
responding to the rise in asset prices has the
undesirable effect of temporarily stifling the
beneficial impact of the technology boom.
We explore the issue a bit further by calculat-
ing the unconditional variability of the output
gap (output minus potential output) under the
fourdifferentpolicyscenarios,assuminginthis
case that only a productivity shock has buffeted
the economy.
23 The right panel of Table 1
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Chart 4
THE EFFECTS OF LEVERAGE ON RESPONSES TO AN ASSET PRICE
BOOM AND BUST
Notes:SameexerciseasinChart3,comparisonofhighsteady-stateleverage(ratioofnetworthtocapitalof0.5,asinbaselinesimula-
tions) and low steady-state leverage (net worth-capital ratio of 0.75). Monetary policy is assumed to target expected inflation aggres-
sively.reports the results. As with the case of bubble
shocks, the results indicate that the policy that
responds aggressively to inflation and does not
target stock prices works best.
A shock to the external finance premium. The
lastscenarioweconsiderisadisruptionoffinan-
cialmarketsthattemporarilytightenscreditcon-
ditions. A real-world example is the default on
Russian bonds in the fall of 1998 that induced
significant capital losses for key bank creditors
and drove up premiums on long-term corporate
bonds.
24 The analogue in our model is a shock
that drives up the premium for external finance,
holding constant firm balance-sheet positions.
Formally this can be modeled as a decline in the
efficiency of the financial intermediation pro-
cess (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, forth-
coming). Chart 6 shows the responses of output
andinflationtoanexogenous50-basis-pointrise
in the external finance premium, under both the
aggressiveandaccommodativepolicyrules(itis
assumed here that policy does not respond to
asset prices). The figure shows clearly that the
aggressive policy response works best. We
believe that this experiment helps to provide a
rationale for the Feds intervention in the fall of
1998. Basically, because the rise in the spread
observed at that time had a potentially defla-
tionary effect on the economy, it was appropri-
ate to ease policy in response.
IV. ESTIMATED REACTION
FUNCTIONS FOR THE FEDERAL
RESERVE AND THE BANK OF
JAPAN
Section III considered the stabilizing proper-
ties of various hypothetical interest rate rules
for central banks. These experiments raise the
question of what rules (reaction functions) best
describe the actual practice of contemporary
central banks. In practice, do central banks
reacttoforecastsofinflationandtheoutputgap
in a stabilizing manner? And do they react to
stock prices, over and above the reaction to


















5 01 5 10 5 0 15 10
Chart 5
RESPONSES TO STOCK-PRICE INCREASES BASED ON A MIXTURE OF
FUNDAMENTAL AND NONFUNDAMENTAL FORCES
Notes: The figure shows the simulated responses of selected variables to a permanent 1 percent increase in productivity followed by a
five-periodpositivebubble.Monetarypolicyisaggressiveintargetinginflation.Thesolidlineshowsresponseswhenpolicyresponds
to the lagged stock prices as well as expected inflation, the dashed line shows responses when policy responds to expected inflation
only.stock prices implied by the pursuit of output and
inflation stabilization?
In this section we apply the methods of
Clarida, Gertler, and Gali (1998, forthcoming),
henceforth CGG, to estimate forward-looking
reaction functions for the Federal Reserve and
the Bank of Japan for the period since 1979. To
preview the results, we find that the Fed has
largely followed our advice over the past two
decades, reacting in a strongly stabilizing man-
ner to changes in the inflation forecast and the
expected output gap but, for the most part, not
reacting to changes in stock prices (except to the
extent that they contain information about infla-
tionandoutput).TherecordoftheBankofJapan
is less satisfactory by our estimates. We find that
easy monetary policy in Japan actively fueled
the increase in stock prices during the 1987-89
period. After the stock market crashed in 1990,
Japanese monetary policy appeared to make
someattempttosupportstockpricesbutfailedto
react sufficiently aggressively to the declining
rateofinflation.Consequently,Japanesemone-
tary policy was too tight from late 1992 at least
until the beginning of 1996. To some extent, it
should be noted, these problems reflected the
veryslowrateofadjustmentofnominalinterest
rates in the face of changing macroeconomic
conditions.
CGGs approach, which we follow here, is to
estimate forward-looking reaction functions of
the form
where rt
* is the targeted value of the nominal
instrument rate (the federal funds rate for the
United States, the call rate for Japan); r is the long-
run equilibrium nominal rate; Et t ()
* pp + - 12 is
the expected deviation of inflation from its target
rate over the next 12 months; Ey y tt t ()
* - is
the contemporaneous value of the output gap,
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Chart 6
THE EFFECTS OF A RISE IN THE EXTERNAL FINANCE PREMIUM
Notes: Shown are responses to an exogenous 50-basis-point rise in the premium for external finance, with autoregressive coefficient
0.9. Monetary policy responds only to expected inflation. The dashed lines show variable responses under accommodative monetary
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Aggressive
Accommodativeconditional on information available to the cen-
tral bank at time t; and [equa in text] represents
other variables that may affect the target interest
rate.Weexpecttheparameters bandg tobepos-
itive. CGG point out that stabilization of infla-
tionfurtherrequires b>1,i.e.,fortherealinterest
rate to rise when expected inflation rises, the
nominalinterestratemustberaisedbymorethan
the increase in expected inflation. In practice, val-
ues of b for central banks with significant
emphasis on inflation stabilization are estimated
tobecloserto2.0.Valueslessthan1.3orsoindi-
cate a weak commitment to inflation stabiliza-
tion (at these values of b the real interest rate
moves relatively little in response to changes in
expected inflation).
Because of unmodeled motives for interest-
ratesmoothing,adjustmentoftheactualnominal
interest rate toward its target may be gradual.
CGG allow for this by assuming a partial
adjustment mechanism, e.g.,
where rt is the actual nominal interest rate and
pÏ[,) 01 captures the degree of interest-rate
smoothing. Below, we follow CGG in assum-
ing a first-order partial adjustment mechanism,
as in equation (4.2), for Japan and a sec-
ond-orderpartialadjustmentmechanismforthe
United States.
To estimate the reaction function implied by
equations (4.1) and (4.2), CGG replace the
expectations of variables in equation (4.1) with
actual realized values of the variables, then
apply an instrumental variables methodology,
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Table 2
FEDERAL RESERVE REACTION FUNCTIONS
























Sample period: 79:10 - 97:12
Notes: The dependent variable is the federal funds rate. The output gap is measured as the residuals from a regression of
industrial production on time and time squared for the period 1960:1-1998:12. Estimates are by GMM with correction for
MA(12) autocorrelation. The optimal weighting matrix is obtained from first-step 2SLS parameter estimates. c
2 Tests for
overidentifying restrictions are easily passed (p > 0.95) in all specifications.
1 The instrument set includes a constant, plus lags 1-6, 9, and 12 of log-differenced commodity prices (Dow-Jones),
log-differenced CPI, log-differenced output gap, and the federal funds rate.
2 The instrument set is the same as above plus lags 1-6 of the log-differenced change in stock prices.
3Sum of the coefficients on lags 0-5 inclusive of the log-differenced change in stock prices. The reported standard error is
for the sum of the coefficients. The p-value for the hypothesis that all six coefficients are euqal to zero is 0.021.
(4.2) t t t t r r r u r r+ + - = -1
* ) 1 (using as instruments only variables known at
timet-1orearlier.Undertheassumptionofratio-
nal expectations, expectational errors will be
uncorrelated with the instruments, so that the IV
procedure produces consistent estimates of the
reaction function parameters.
25
Estimation results are shown in Table 2 for
theFederalReserveandTable3fortheBankof
Japan. Following CGG, we begin the U.S. sam-
ple period in 1979:10, the date of the Volcker
regime shift, and the Japanese sample period in
1979:04, a period CGG refer to as one of sig-
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Table 3
BANK OF JAPAN REACTION FUNCTIONS




























































Sample period: 89:07 - 97:12
Notes: The dependent variable is the call rate. The output gap is measured as the residuals (forecast errors, after 1989:6)
from a regression of industrial production on time and time squared for the period 1968:1-1989:6. Estimates are by GMM
withcorrectionforMA(12)autocorrelation.Theoptimalweightingmatrixisobtainedfromfirst-step2SLSparameteresti-
mates. c
2 tests for overidentifying restrictions are easily passed (p > 0.95) in all specifications.
1 The instrument set includes a constant, plus lags 1-6, 9, and 12 of log-differenced commodity prices (IMF), log-differ-
enced CPI, log-differenced output gap, and log-differenced real yen-dollar exchange rate, and the call rate.
2 The instrument set is the same as above plus lags 1-6 of the log-differenced change in stock prices.
3Sum of the coefficients on lags 0-5 inclusive of the log-differenced change in stock prices. The reported standard error is
for the sum of the coefficients. The p-value for the hypothesis that all six coefficients are equal to zero is 0.020 for the full
sample, 0.000 for both the 79:04 - 89:06 and 89:07 - 97:12 subsamples.nificant financial deregulation. The end date in
each case is 1997:12 (our data end in 1998:12
but we must allow for the fact that one year of
future price change is included on the right-hand
side).
26 We also look at two subsamples for
Japan,theperiodsbeforeandafter1989:6.Itwas
attheendof1989thatincreasesinBankofJapan
interest rates were followed by the collapse of
stock prices and land values.
For each country and sample period, the tables
report two specifications. As in CGG, the base-
line specification shows the response of the tar-
get for the instrument interest rate to the
expected output gap and expected inflation. The
second, alternative specification adds to the
reaction function the current value and five lags
of the log-difference of an index of the stock
market (the S&P 500 for the United States and
theTOPIXindexforJapan).Tohelpcontrolfor
simultaneity bias, we instrument for the con-
temporaneous log-difference in the stock mar-
ket index. In particular, we add lags 1 through 6
of the log-difference of the stock market index
to our list of instruments (see endnote 20).
Note, therefore, that in these estimates, the
responsesofpolicytostockmarketreturnsaris-
ing from the predictive power of stock returns
for output and inflation are fully accounted for.
Any estimated response of policy to stock
returns must therefore be over and above the
part due to the predictive power of stock
returns.
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Chart 7
ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES OF THE U.S. FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
Notes: The chart shows actual and fitted values of the U.S. federal funds rate, with fitted values derived from a model that accommo-



















































ActualThere are two ways to think about the addition
of stock market returns to the reaction function.
The first is to interpret it literally as saying that
monetary policy is reacting directly to stock
prices, as well as to the output gap and expected
inflation. The second is to treat the addition of
stock returns as a general specification test that
reveals whether monetary policy is pursuing
other objectives besides stabilization of output
and expected inflation. To the extent that policy
has other objectives, and there is information
about these objectives in the stock market, then
we would expect to see stock returns enter the
central banks reaction function with a statisti-
cally significant coefficient.
For the United States, the estimates of the
baseline reaction function (first line of Table 2)
indicate that during the full sample period the
Fed responded reasonably strongly to changes
in forecasted inflation (b =160 .) . It also reacted
in a stabilizing manner to forecasts of the out-
put gap(. ) g =014 . Both parameter estimates are
highlystatisticallysignificant.TheCGGproce-
dure also permits estimation of the implied tar-
get rate of inflation. For the United States, the
estimated target inflation rate for the full period
is 2.88 percent per year. Chart 7 shows that the
actual and fitted values of the federal funds rate
are very close for the full sample period.
27
In the results reported in the second line of
Table2,weallowforthepossibilitythattheFed
responded to stock market returns (or to infor-
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Chart 8
ACTUAL AND TARGET VALUES OF THE U.S. FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
Notes: The chart shows actual and fitted values of the U.S. federal funds rate, with fitted values derived from a model that accommo-











































4 4mation contained in stock market returns) inde-
pendently of their implication for forecasts of
inflation and the output gap. The estimated
response of the funds rate to stock returns, -0.08,
is relatively small, the wrong sign (if we think
of the Fed as being tempted to try to stabilize
stock prices), and statistically insignificant.
Other parameter estimates are largely
unchanged from the baseline specification. The
force of these estimates is that, consistent with
the advice we give in this paper, the Fed has
focused its attention on expected inflation and
the output gap and has neither actively sought to
stabilize stock prices nor reacted to information
in stock returns other than that useful for fore-
casting the output gap and inflation.
To help put the Feds behavior into its histori-
cal context, Chart 8 shows the actual value and
the estimated target value of the federal funds
rate for the period January 1984 to the present.
The target value differs from the fitted value in
that the latter incorporates the interest-rate
smoothing parameters and the former implic-
itly sets these to zero, i.e., the target value is the
interest rate given by equation (4.1). For this
figure,thetargetvalueateachdateiscalculated
assumingthattheFedhadperfectknowledgeof
the current output gap and inflation over the
next year. We do this in order to concentrate on
intentional deviations of policy from the aver-
age reaction function, as opposed to deviations
drivenprimarilybyforecasterrors.Becausethe
target value abstracts from the interest-rate
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Chart 9
ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES OF THE JAPANESE CALL MONEY RATE






















































2 2smoothing motive, there is a tendency for the
actual rate to lag somewhat behind the target.
Nevertheless, Chart 8 suggests that the Feds
actual choice of short-term rates followed target
rates reasonably closely.
There are, however, three periods of deviation
of the actual fed funds rate from the target rate in
Chart 8 that deserve comment. First, as was
much remarked at the time, the Fed did not ease
policy in 1985-86, even though a sharp decline
in oil prices reduced inflation during those
years.
28 The view expressed by some contempo-
rary observers was that the Fed made a con-
scious decision in 1986 to enjoy the beneficial
supplyshockintheformofalowerinflationrate
rather than real economic expansion. However,
itisalsolikelythatmuchofthedeclineininfla-
tion in 1986 was unanticipated, contrary to the
perfectforesightassumptionmadeinconstruct-
ing the figure. If true, this would account for
muchofthedeviationofactualratesfromtarget
in 1985.
Second, the Fed kept rates somewhat below
target in the aftermath of the 1987 stock market
crash. Again, forecasting errors may account
forthisdeviation.TheFedwasconcernedatthe
time that the depressing effects of the crash
would be larger than, in fact, they turned out
to be.
Finally, and most interesting to us, the Fed
kept the funds rate significantly below target
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Chart 10
ACTUAL AND TARGET VALUES OF THE JAPANESE CALL MONEY RATE












































-4 -4from late 1991 until the beginning of 1995. This
was a period of slow recovery from the 1990-91
recession, which Fed officials argued was caused
byfinancialheadwinds,suchasexcessivecor-
porate leverage and bank capital problems. We
interpret the 1991-95 easing as being consistent
with our advice, in that the Fed was concerned
aboutfinancialconditionsnotforthemselvesbut
primarily for their implications for the macro-
economy.
29 In the event, though, it appears that




sample period, estimates of the Bank of Japans
reaction function (Table 3) look qualitatively
similar to those found for the Fed. For the whole
1979-97 period, we estimate that the Bank of
Japan responded actively to both expected infla-
tion (. ) b =221 and to the output gap (. ) g =020.
The equation also fits the data quite well (Chart
9).
32 However, inspection of the data suggests
two very different economic and policy regimes
during this period: the so-called bubble econ-
omy of the 1980s, during which the economy
and asset prices boomed, and the period since
1990 during which asset prices have collapsed
and the economy has been extremely weak.
Accordingly, and keeping in mind the problems
inherent in estimation based on small samples,
we reestimated the Bank of Japans reaction
function for the period before and after 1989:06.
The date was chosen to separate the periods
before and after the accession of Governor
Mieno, who instigated a significant policy tight-
ening at the end of 1989.
Table3showsthat,forthefirsthalfofthesam-
ple period, the Bank of Japan remained commit-
ted to stabilization of inflation (b =200 . in the
baseline specification, b =185 . in the specifica-
tionincludingstockreturns).However,thespec-
ification including stock returns also shows that,
wittingly or unwittingly, the Bank of Japan was
also strongly reinforcing the asset price explo-
sion. The estimated reaction of the Japanese call
rate to stock returns during the past six months
is 0.286 in the first half of the sample, with a
standard error of 0.111. This says that each 10
percent increase in stock prices was associated
with a 286-basis-point decline in the call
ratea number too large to be taken seriously,
but an indication that policy was destabilizing
toward the stock market prior to 1989. As
noted, we do not necessarily interpret these
results as saying that the Bank was actively
attempting to raise stock prices. But it does
seem that the Bank was pursuing objectives
other than output and inflation stabilization
(exchange rates?) which led it to ease exces-
sively, and the stock market reflected that
ease.
33
For the second half of the sample, the results
are much different. As the bottom third of Table 3
indicates, after 1989 the Bank of Japan greatly
weakeneditscommitmenttoinflationstabiliza-
tion (b =112 . in the baseline stabilization). We
interpret the low estimated value of b, together
with the negative estimated values of the infla-
tion target, as indicating that the Bank was not
activelyresistingthepowerfuldeflationaryforces
of this period. However, our estimates suggest
that the Bank may have been attempting to sta-
bilize the stock market, or some other factor
proxied by the stock market; the estimated reac-
tion of the call rate to stock market returns
switches from the large negative value in the
earlier subsample to a large and highly signifi-
cant positive value (. ) x =0188 . From the per-
spective of the arguments advanced in this
paper, the Bank of Japan would have done
better to focus instead on stabilizing the infla-
tionrate(inthiscase,preventingtheplungeinto
deflation) than in responding to other factors.
Again, a picture helps to provide historical
context. In analogy to Chart 8, Chart 10 shows
theactualcallmoneyrateandtheestimatedtar-
get rate in Japan after 1984. In this case, unlike
in Chart 8, we calculate the target rate using the
reaction function estimated for the pre-1989:07
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function seems the right one to use as a bench-
mark because it implies strongly stabilizing
monetarypolicy,assuggestedbythesimulations
in the previous section. Thus, the target rate for
the post-1989 period in Chart 10 indicates what
policywouldhavebeeniftheearlierpolicieshad
been continued, with no attention paid to stock
returns (except as forecasters of the output gap
and inflation).
The results are, again, quite interesting. The
target rate in Japan changed sharply during sev-
eral episodes, andpossibly as a result of an
excessive attachment to interest-rate smooth-
ingtheactualcallratelaggedfarbehind.Chart
10 suggests that policy was, on the whole, rather
tight in Japan during the 1985-87 period, despite
the easing that followed the Plaza Agreement of
September 1985. From 1987 to 1989, however,
Japan faced strong inflationary pressures
(including rocketing asset prices and rapid real
growth), to which the Bank of Japan responded
extremely slowly.
34 No doubt, it is this period
that is responsible for our estimated result that
monetary policy actively destabilized the stock
market in the pre-1990 period.
Rates began to rise sharply following the
appointment of Governor Mieno in December
1989, and continued to rise until the spring of
1991. The rate increase was undertaken with the
intention of curbing the stock market andlike
many other attempts to prick market bubbles,
including the U.S. boom in 1929the attempt
was too successful for the good of the economy.
Asset prices collapsed; and because Japans
financial arrangements were particularly sensi-
tive to asset values (we would argue), the real
economy collapsed as well.
Our estimates of the Bank of Japans reaction
function for the second half of the sample sug-
gest two countervailing forces. On one hand,
there was now some attempt to stabilize the
stock market, or some factor proxied by the
stockmarket,bycuttingratesasthemarketfell.
Ontheotherhand,theBankofJapanscommit-
ment to stabilizing inflation (here, resisting defla-
tion) seems to have become much weaker. The
net effect was policy that was significantly too
tight, at least until the beginning of 1996.
35
We do not want to overstate the conclusions
thatcanbedrawnfromthisshortcomparisonof
U.S. and Japanese monetary policy since the
mid-1980s. The comparative experience is at
least suggestive, however, that focusing on the
traditional goals of monetary policythe out-
put gap and expected inflationis the more
effectivemeansofavoidingextendedswingsin
asset prices and the resulting damage to the
economy.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to explore the issue of how monetary
policy should respond to variability in asset
prices, we incorporated nonfundamental move-
ments in asset prices into a dynamic macroeco-
nomic framework. To a first approximation at
least, we believe that our framework captures the
main concerns that policymakers have about pos-
sible bubbles in asset prices. In particular, in our
model, a large positive bubble exposes the
economytotheriskofasharpmarketcorrection,
with adverse effects on aggregate demand and
economic activity. In the absence of an appro-
priate policy response, the resulting economic
contraction could be quite large. Asevere mar-
ket drop in our model also weakens balance
sheets, induces financial distress, leads to fur-
therdeclinesinassetprices,andwidensspreads
in bond markets. Although our framework omits
some of the microeconomic details of episodes
of stress (for example, nonprice credit rationing,
reduced liquidity of financial markets), and,
hence, is silent about certain types of





42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThe principal conclusion of this paper has
been stated several times. In brief, it is that flexi-
bleinflation-targetingprovidesaneffective,uni-
fied framework for achieving both general
macroeconomic stability and financial stability.
Given a strong commitment to stabilizing
expected inflation, it is neither necessary nor
desirable for monetary policy to respond to
changes in asset prices, except to the extent that
they help to forecast inflationary or deflationary
pressures.
A couple of additional issues deserve very
brief comment. First, our implicit focus in this
paper has been on large industrial economies
such as the United States and Japan. However,
many of the recent financial crises around the
world have occurred in small open economies,
with international capital flows and attacks on
the currency playing major roles. What lessons
does our analysis bear for these countries?
More work would need to be done to extend
our model to the open-economy case, and to
include other sources of financial crisis, such as
speculative attacks on the currency and bank
runs. Such an extension would be worthwhile,
we believe, because it seems to us that bal-
ance-sheet effects of the type captured in the
BGG model have played an important role in
propagating the effects of financial crises
throughtherealeconomy.Althoughwehavenot
yet done such an extension, one likely conclu-
sion from such an exercise seems obvious
enoughandimportantenoughtobeworthstating
now; that is: The logic of our approach suggests
stronglythatfixedexchangerates,asmaintained
bymanyofthecountriesrecentlyhitbyfinancial
crises, are highly undesirable in a financially
fragile environment.
The key problem with an exchange-rate peg is
that its defense generally requires movements in
interest rates that are perverse, relative to the
objective of containing a financial crisis. In par-
ticular,thelargeincreasesininterestratesneces-
sary to avert devaluation during a currency
crisis exacerbate financial crises both directly,
by depressing asset prices, reducing corporate
profits, and putting pressure on banks, and also
indirectly, by slowing current and expected
rates of economic activity. In addition,
fixed-exchange-rate regimes severely limit the
short-run discretion of the central bank, either
to assist the financial system (for example,
through lender-of-last-resort activities) or to
correct short-term imbalances in the economy.
Indeed,therecordoffixed-exchangeregimes
in regard to the incidence and severity of finan-
cial crises is notoriously bad.
37 During the
Great Depression currency crises (possible, of
course, only if the exchange rate is fixed),
banking panics, and stock market crashes fre-
quentlyoccurredtogether.Indeed,tothebestof
our knowledge, every one of the dozens of
major banking panics of that era occurred in a
country that was attempting to defend a fixed
rate (its gold parity). For the postwar period, in
a study spanning the 1970s through the 1990s,
Kaminsky and Reinhart document that banking
and currency crises frequently occurred
together and appeared to be mutually reinforc-
ing. The strong observed association between
fixed exchange rates and financial crises
appears to be weakened only under two condi-
tions: First, if international capital flows are
highly regulated and restricted, as was the case,
for example, during the Bretton Woods era; or
second, if the international monetary system is
cooperatively managed by the major central
banks,aswasarguablythecaseduringtheclas-
sical gold standard of the late nineteenth cen-
tury (Eichengreen). Neither of these conditions
prevails today.
So, what should small open economies do?
Our analysis suggests that, if possible, they
adopt flexible inflation targeting as part of a
broad reform package that includes improved
financial regulation and fiscal reform.
38 (Brazil
has recently proposed a plan along these lines.)
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emphasis:Changeinthemonetaryregimealone,
without support from the regulatory and fiscal
armsofgovernment,isnotlikelytobesufficient.
Moreover, we recognize that successful imple-
mentation of inflation targeting requires both
amplepoliticalsupportfromthegovernmentand
a certain amount of institutional development,
for example, the existence of adequate price
indexes (see Eichengreen and others). With
these caveats, we recommend that small open
economies head in an inflation-targeting direc-
tion. Note that, along with providing enhanced
macroeconomic and financial stability, a com-
mitment to an inflation-targeting approach by a
small open economy could well deliver greater
long-run stability of the nominal exchange rate
than a regime that attempts to fix the exchange
rate but suffers frequent forced devaluations.
A second broad issue not yet addressed here
concerns the difference between implicit infla-
tion targeting, of the type practiced by the
Greenspan Fed, and explicit inflation targeting,
whichinvolvesconsiderableadditionaltranspar-
ency and communication with the public. It is
evidentfromrecentU.S.experiencethatimplicit
inflation targeting can give good results, and,
indeed, our simulations help to show why a
strong focus on stabilizing expected inflation
promotes overall macroeconomic and financial
stability.We,nevertheless,believethattheUnited
States would benefit from a move to explicit
inflation targeting, for at least two reasons (see
Bernanke and others 1999, for further discus-
sion). First, making inflation targeting explicit
would serve the important goal of ensuring
continuity in monetary policy, or at least of
increasing the likelihood that future policy
wouldtakethesamegeneralapproachasrecent
policy has taken. In particular, if the infla-
tion-targeting regime were made explicit, the
transition from the current chairman to the next
one would create less anxiety in financial mar-
kets and for the economy than otherwise. Sec-
ond, transparency enhances the stabilizing
properties of forward-looking policies. In par-
ticular, in the simulations reported in this paper
we implicitly assumed transparency of policy,
in that private-sector actors were assumed to
know the policy rule. The results might be very
different if, for example, we assumed that pri-
vate agents thought the central bank was fol-
lowingtheaccommodativerulewhen,infact,it
was following the more aggressive infla-
tion-targeting policy. Likewise, much of the
stabilizing effect of our recommended policy
arisesbecauseinvestorsexpectthecentralbank
to raise interest rates when rising asset prices
threaten to overheat the economy, and vice
versaifdecliningassetpricesthreatentoinduce
an economic contraction. From the standpoint
of maintaining both macroeconomic and finan-
cial stability in the future, the desirability of
increased transparency in U.S. monetary
policymaking is a topic deserving of close
attention in the Feds planning.
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APPENDIX
EQUATIONS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL
ThemodelusedforsimulationsinSection
3 is given and briefly described below. To
conserve space, we do not review the indi-
vidual and firm optimization problems that
underlie the behavioral equations and,
instead, refer the reader to Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (forthcoming) for
details. What we present here is the
log-linearized versions of the model equa-
tions that were used in the simulations.
Except for the addition of an exogenous
bubbleintheassetprice,themodelisessen-
tially the same as in BGG. The only other
significant differences are that we use Gali
and Gertlers variant of the new Keynesian
Phillips curve and that we calibrate the
wealth effects on consumption to match the
evidence presented by Ludvigson and
Steindel.
Throughout, we follow the convention of
writing steady-state levels of the variables
in upper case and log-deviations from the
steady state in lower case. Greek letters and
lowercaseRomanletterswithoutsubscripts
denote fixed parameters, and subscripts
denote time periods. The expectation given
information known as of period [equa in
text] of the value of variable c in period r is
written Esr c .
Aggregate demand
Equation (A.1) is the log-linearized version
of the national income identity. We distin-
guish between consumption of households,
C, and consumption of entrepreneurs/ firm-
owners,C
e; otherwise the notation is stan-
dard. (A.2) is the usual Euler condition for
household consumption. (A.3) embodies
the assumption that changes in entrepre-
neurial consumption are proportional to
changes in stock values; in the simulations
we normalize entrepreneurs net worth so
that the elasticity of entrepreneurial con-
sumption to stock market wealth is about
0.04, as suggested by estimates in
Ludvigson and Steindel. (A.4) relates
investment to the fundamental value of
capital, embodying a one-period delay for
planning new investment.
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Equation (A.5) describes the expected
evolution of the bubble, cf. (2.4) and recall
ab º- /( ) 1 d . Note that the realized value
ofthebubble,conditionalonnotbursting,is
defined by
Equation (A.6) defines the fundamental
return to capital as the sum of the current
return to capital and the increase in funda-
mental value, where mcis the marginal cost
of production (equal to the inverse of the
markup) and
where ais capitals share. (A.7) defines the
returns to stocks analogously. (A.8) shows
that the relationship between the stock
return and the fundamental return depends
on the presence of the bubble; cf. (2.6).
Equation (A.9) links the spread between
safe returns and stock returns to firm lever-
age, where n is the log-deviation of firms
internal equity from its steady-state value.
Aggregate supply
Equation (A.10) is a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, where z is the log-devia-
tion of total factor productivity from its
steady-state value and l is labor input.
(A.11)isthefirst-orderconditionforhouse-
holds labor-leisure decision, where c is a
parameter of the utility function (we assume
log utility so that the coefficient on con-
sumptionin(A.11)isone).(A.12)describes
the evolution of inflation when prices are
changed stochastically as in Calvo (1983)
and a subset of firms use rule-of-thumb
pricing as in Gali and Gertler (forthcom-
ing). If q f =1and qb =0then (A.12) is the
fully rational, forward-looking version of
the Phillips curve with exogenously sticky
prices. Allowing qb >1 introduces a back-
ward-looking element and, hence, additional
inertia into the inflation process.
Evolution of state variables and shock
processes
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1 As we show in the context of our simulation model below,
even when a bubble is present, the market price can still be
expressed as a discounted stream of cash flows, though with
a discount rate that differs from the fundamental rate. In par-
ticular, periods in which the market price is above the funda-
mental are also periods in which the implied discount rate is
belowthetruefundamentalrate,andviceversa. Becausethe
fundamental discount rate is not directly observable, it is,
in general, impossible to know whether there is a
nonfundamental component to the current stock price.
2Tobeclear,fortheanalysisthatfollowsitisonlynecessary
thatnonfundamentalmovementsinassetpricesaffectaggre-
gate demand. In other work we have found that, to explain
theobservedvolatilityofoutput,itisnecessarytohaveabal-
ance-sheet channel supplementing the traditional wealth
effect.
3 For relevant surveys see Bernanke and Gertler (1995),
Hubbard (1997), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), and
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (forthcoming).
4 We implicitly include in this definition any institutional
and regulatory structure that may affect private sector risk
exposure. For example, both U.S. and Japanese banks hold
real estate (or make loans with real estate as collateral), but
by law only Japanese banks are allowed to hold equities.
This apparently incidental difference has strong implica-
tions for the likely effects of a stock-price collapse on bank
capital and bank lending in the two countries, as indeed we
have seen in Japan in the past few years.
5 Inflation targeting has been adopted in recent years by a
substantial number of industrialized and developing coun-
tries, including (among many others) the United Kingdom,
Sweden, Canada, New Zealand, Chile, and most recently
Brazil. An extensive literature has developed on the early
experience with this approach; see, for example, Goodhart
and Viñals (1994), Haldane (1995), Leiderman and Svens-
son(1995),BernankeandMishkin(1997),andBernankeet
al. (1999) for comparative analyses.
6Inflationtargetinghasbeencastigatedinsomequartersas
a policy of inflation nutters, to use Mervyn Kings
descriptivephrase. Thiscriticismissimplyincorrect,how-
ever. As Lars Svensson (1997, 1999) has shown, inflation
targeting is completely consistent with a conventional qua-
dratic central-bank loss function that places arbitrary
weights on the output gap and inflation; in other words,
inflation targeting in no way precludes significant attention
to conventional stabilization objectives.
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capitalandinternalequity,respectively.tis
the probability that a given firm survives
into the next period. Equations (A.15) and
(A.16) state that government spending and
total factor productivity follow first-order
autoregressive processes.
Monetary policy rule and interest-rate
determination
(A.17) is one example of an interest-rate
rule for monetary policy; cf. equation (3.1).
(A.18) defines the real interest rate.
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APPENDIX - continuedSo what then is new? One important advantage is that an
inflation-targeting framework makes explicit (for both
policymakers and the public) the simple fact that mone-
tary-policy actions that expand output and employment, but
whichalsoleavetheinflationratehigherthanitwasinitially,
do not necessarily increase social welfare on net. Instead,
account must also be taken of the future losses in output and
employment that will be necessary to bring inflation back to
its initial level; or, alternatively, of the various distortions
and reductions in long-term economic growth associated
with a permanent increase in inflation. By enforcing the
requirement that any sequence of policy actions be consis-
tent with the long-run inflation target (a sort of nominal
anchor requirement), the inflation-targeting framework
eliminates the upward inflation ratchet that proved so costly
in many countries in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s.
7 Note that even theories that stress the self-fulfilling nature
of crisis expectations (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994), usually imply
that such expectations can only arise if fundamentals are rel-
atively weak.
8 Interested readers are referred to Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (forthcoming) for additional detail.
9 Finite lives are a metaphor for the entry and exit of firms
and the associated turnover in credit markets. The assump-
tionoffinitelivesalsopreventsthebusinesssectorfromever
reaching a steady state in which it is entirely self-financing.
10 Specifically, we use a variant of Calvos (1983) staggered
price setting model developed by Gali and Gertler (forth-
coming) that allows a subset of firms to use rule-of-thumb
pricing behavior. The resulting aggregate supply equation is
similar in spirit to the sticky inflation model of Fuhrer and
Moore (1995).
11Wealsomakesomesmallerchangesthatareimportantfor
the simulations we want to do, such as calibrating a realistic
effect of changes in asset prices on consumption.
12 We do not attempt to rationalize why investors do not
arbitragethedifferencebetweenthemarketandfundamental
returns. To our knowledge, any theory of bubbles based on
market psychology relies on some arbitrary assumption
along these lines. This point also applies to the so-called
rationalbubblesofBlanchardandWatson(1982).Wedonot
useBlanchard-Watsonrationalbubblesinthispaperbecause
their nonstationarity creates technical problems in our
framework.
13Bytreatingtheprobabilitythatthebubbleburstsasexoge-
nous, we rule out the possibility that monetary policy can
surgically prick the bubble. Although it is certainly possible
to endogenize this probability, so little is known about the
effectsofpolicyactionsonmarketpsychologythatanymod-
ification along these lines would necessarily be ad hoc.
Note that it is nevertheless the case in our framework that
asset prices will be highly sensitive to monetary policy,
since policy can affect the fundamental component. Thus,
the empirical observation that asset prices react strongly to
monetary policy actions is not direct evidence against the
exogeneity assumption made here.
14Notethata = 1correspondstotheso-calledrationalbub-
ble described in Blanchard and Watson (1982). Hence, our
bubble specification can be made arbitrarily close to a
rational bubble by the assumption that ais close to one.




policy makes the simulation results presented below look
somewhat less realistic (because policy reacts too
quicklytochangesintheeconomy)butdoesnotaffectthe
qualitative nature of the results.
16 We assume p = 0.5 and a= 0.98.
17 To be clear, agents in the model know only the ex ante
stochasticprocessforthebubbleandnotthetimethatitwill
burst.
18 All simulations are reported as deviations from the
steady state.
19 We consider the accommodating policy not because it is
arealisticalternative,butrathertounderscorethepointthat
the impact of a bubble is highly sensitive to the response of
monetary policy.
20Notethatweassumethatpolicyrespondstothe(observ-
able) level of stock prices, not the (unobservable) level of
the bubble, which seems realistic. That distinction is not
importantinthepresentexercisebutwillbecomeimportant
inscenariosinwhichthecentralbankisuncertainaboutthe
source of the appreciation in stock prices.
21 Under the usual assumption that social welfare depends
on the output gap and inflation, we can, therefore, unam-
biguously conclude that the inflation-targeting rule maxi-
mizes welfare.
22 The model does not include raw-material or fin-
ished-goods inventories. Inclusion of inventory stocks in
the model would likely increase the downward reaction by
adding an endogenous inventory cycle.
23 That is, for simplicity here we do not include a con-
founding bubble shock. The welfare comparisons would
not be affected by including a bubble shock.
48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY24 For evidence that general credit conditions tightened at
this time, see Gertler and Lown (1999).
25 More specifically, CGG apply a GMM estimator with a
correction for the moving average error induced by overlap-
ping forecasts (see their endnote 11 for details). Our estima-
tion procedure follows the CGG method very closely, with
minor differences described below. In particular, we follow
CGG in using as instruments a constant, and lags 1-6, 9, and
12 of log-differenced commodity price index, the log-differ-
enced CPI, the log-differenced output gap, and the instru-
ment interest rate. For Japan, lags 1-6, 9, and 12 of the real
yen-dollar exchange rate are also included as instruments.
For the commodity price index, we use slightly different
series from CGG, specifically, an IMF series for Japan and
the Dow-Jones commodity price index for the United States.
In auxiliary regressions, discussed below, we also use lags 1
to 6 of the log-difference of the stock price index (TOPIX in
Japan and the S&P 500 for the United States).
Following CGG, we construct the output gap for the United
Statesastheresidualsofaregressionofindustrialproduction
on a constant, time, and time squared, for the sample period
1960:1 through 1998:12. Because we believe that Japan has
been well below potential output since about 1990, the out-
put gap variable we construct for Japan is based on a qua-
dratic trend for industrial production based on data
beginning in 1968:1 and ending in 1989:6. Through 1989:6
the Japanese output gap is measured as the residual from this
regression, subsequently it is equated to actual output less
the extrapolated quadratic trend value of output. We thank
Richard Clarida for providing the estimation programs.
26 Estimates (not shown) from samples ending in 1994:12,
the end date used by CGG, closely replicated their results.
27 The fitted values assume that expected inflation and the
expected output gap are the realized values. They are thus
comparable to the target values reported in Chart 8; see
below.
28 Kozicki (1999) observes, however, that this gap is greatly
reduced if a core inflation measure is used in the estimation
of the Feds reaction function.
29 Kozicki (1999) makes a similar observation and provides
supportforhercontentionwiththefollowingrevealingquote
from Chairman Greenspan:
 In the spring of 1989, we began to ease monetary condi-
tions as we observed the consequence of balance-sheet
strains resulting from increased debt, along with significant
weakness in the collateral underlying that debt. Households
and businesses began much more reluctant to borrow and
spend and lenders to extend credit  a phenomenon often
referred to as the credit crunch. In an endeavor to defuse
thesefinancialstrainswemovedshort-termrateslowerina
long series of steps that ended in the late summer of 1992,
and we held them at unusually low levels through the end
of 1993  both absolutely and, importantly, relative to
inflation. (Testimony of June 22, 1994).
30 An alternative interpretation, which is consistent with
our general approach, is that financial conditions in certain
key sectors and regions were sufficiently bade.g., bank
capital positions well below regulatory minimathat the
impact of small interest-rate changes on the economy was
reduced. A reduction in the policy multiplier would justify
more aggressive Fed policies during this period.
31 Our sample period does not include the episode of Fall
1998, when the Fed reacted to increased quality spreads in
the bond market by easing. Again, this action seems justifi-
able to us, in that the widening spreads could well have
been interpreted as predicting a slowdown in the general
economy.
32 The fitted values again assume perfect foresight by the
central bank for inflation and the output gap.
33 Note that it would not be correct to argue that stock
prices matter because of their predictive power for the out-
put gap and inflation. We include stock returns in the infor-
mation sets for forecasting these variables, thereby
controlling for the predictive power of stock returns.
34 Chart 10 suggests that the Bank of Japan should have
raised its key interest rate as high as 8 to 10 percent during
1987-89, which some commentators at the conference
thought would not have been politically feasible given that
contemporaneous inflation (possibly as a result of
exchange rate appreciation) remained low. Our specific
measureofthetargetrateissensitivetoourestimatesofthe
size of the output gap in Japan at the time and is not to be
treated as precise. What is striking about the period is not
that the BOJ failed to tighten radically, but that it failed to
tighten at all. In any case, for the record, we consider the
failure to respond to deflationary pressures during 1992-96
(see below) to be the most serious shortcoming of Japanese
monetary policy during this period.
35AscanbeseeninChart10,thetargetcallratewentnega-
tive in 1993, out of the feasible range of the actual rate.
Still, it was not until 1995 that the actual call rate went
below 2.0 percent.
36 Further, to the extent that (say) collapse of the banking
system would be deflationary, perhaps in a highly discon-
tinuous way, it seems to us that lender-of-last-resort inter-
ventions are consistent with the philosophy of flexible
inflation targeting.
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regimes see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
38 Dollarization or a currency union represent an alternative
approach for small open economies that also avoids the
instabilities of fixed exchange rates. These approaches
have their own problems, however.
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